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Protecting the City of London? UK challenges before the Court of Justice of the 
European Union 
 
Pierre Schammo* 
 
(published as Schammo, P (2014). Protecting the City of London? UK challenges 
before the Court of Justice of the European Union. The Company Lawyer 35: 193-
194) 
 
 
In the February edition of this journal, I referred to a number of legal challenges 
launched by the UK before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU or the 
Court). These challenges concern:  
 
(i) a proposed financial transaction tax (ie, the Council decision authorizing 
closer cooperation between a group of Member States on a financial 
transaction tax);  
(ii) the European Central Bank’s location policy under which central 
counterparties that clear sizeable amounts of Euro denominated derivatives 
are meant to be located in the Eurozone area;  
(iii) a provision – Article 28 – of the EU short selling regulation which vests 
the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) with intervention 
powers; and   
(iv) the so-called bankers’ bonuses cap under EU capital requirements 
legislation.  
 
From the UK’s perspective, all of the above measures threaten the national interest 
and especially the interests of the City of London as an international financial centre. 
In the February edition, I focused in particular on the UK’s challenge to Article 28 of 
the short selling regulation. As a reminder, in challenging Article 28, the UK sought 
to limit the powers which the short selling regulation vests in ESMA. Specifically, the 
UK claimed that Article 28 was unlawful because:  
 
(i) it was adopted on the wrong legal basis: that is, Article 114 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU);  
(ii) it was contrary to the Court’s decisions in Meroni and Romano;1 and  
(iii) it was unlawful in view of the new Treaty provisions on delegated and 
implementing acts (Articles 290 and 291 TFEU).  
 
Importantly, Advocate General (AG) Jääskinen in its non-binding opinion accepted 
the UK’s claim that Article 114 was an inappropriate legal basis.  
However the Grand Chamber of the CJEU in its judgment decided not to 
follow the conclusions of AG Jääskinen and rejected all of the UK’s submissions.2  
First of all, the CJEU did not find that Article 28 was contrary to the Court’s decisions 
in Meroni. As a reminder in Meroni, the Court ruled that wide discretionary powers 
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could not be delegated to an outside body and that a delegator could not delegate 
powers that were different from its own powers. In the short selling case, the Court 
ruled that ESMA’s powers under Article 28 satisfied the requirements laid down in 
Meroni since they were ‘precisely delineated and amenable to judicial review in the 
light of the objectives established by the delegating authority’.3 By assessing ESMA’s 
powers in this manner, the Court made it plain that it was not ready to abandon the 
Meroni decision, even though the judgment stems from an altogether different era and 
Community (ie, the European Coal and Steel Community). However it is also 
apparent that the Court will not adopt a narrow reading of the Meroni requirements 
and that it will not easily accept that a delegation of powers is contrary to these 
requirements.  
The Court had also little sympathy for the UK’s argument that Article 28 was 
contrary to the Court’s decision in Romano.4 In this case, the CJEU held that it was 
not permissible to delegate powers that allowed a body to adopt ‘acts having the force 
of law’.5 However in the short selling case, the Court decided that even though ESMA 
could adopt ‘measures of general application’6 under Article 28, this did not mean 
that Article 28 was ‘at odds with the principle established in Romano’.7 This was so 
because of Treaty provisions which expressly allowed agencies to adopt such acts.8  
Regarding the claim that the delegation was incompatible with Articles 290 
and 291 TFEU, the CJEU concluded that a conferral of powers under Article 28 was 
different from the situations which these Treaty provisions covered.9 Article 28 could 
not be said to undermine them.10 Last but not least, on the question of whether Article 
114 TFEU was the right legal basis, the Court took a markedly different approach to 
that of AG Jääskinen. In his opinion, the latter argued that Article 114 TFEU was an 
inappropriate legal basis. This was so because using Article 28 did not result in 
harmonization, but rather ‘the replacement of national decision making ... with EU 
level decision making’.11 However, the CJEU decided that the EU legislature could 
rely on Article 114 TFEU. By taking this route and rejecting the UK’s submission, the 
Court showed – as it had done before – its willingness to interpret the scope of Article 
114 broadly. Moreover, it readily agreed with the reasoning that the EU legislature 
put forward in the recitals to the short selling regulation in order to justify its 
measures. 12  Admittedly, if the Court had accepted the AG’s proposals, the 
consequences would have been dire for the European System of Financial 
Supervision. It was always unlikely that the Court would take this route, not least 
because of its previous case law on Article 114 TFEU. 
The short selling case is however not the only UK challenge which has been 
decided since the beginning of the year. In late April, the CJEU ruled on the UK’s 
action against the decision authorizing enhanced cooperation in the area of the 
financial transaction tax.13 This challenge followed the decision of a group of Member 
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States to press ahead with the idea of a financial transaction tax after that Member 
States had failed to reach agreement on introducing such a tax on a Union-wide 
basis.14 The UK was among the Member States that were opposed to the measure, as 
it saw it as a threat to the City of London. The Court’s judgment is short. It simply 
dismisses the UK’s challenge on procedural grounds. To come to this decision, the 
CJEU differentiated between a decision authorizing enhanced cooperation among a 
group of Member States – which was the subject matter of the UK challenge – and the 
measures which are finally adopted in order to implement enhanced cooperation in a 
given area. The Court dismissed the UK’s action because it concluded that the UK’s 
submissions were not in fact directed at the decision authorizing enhanced 
cooperation. To be sure, this challenge was also unlikely to succeed, a fact that did 
not escape the UK government. Indeed, the latter acknowledged in its submissions 
that its action might be ‘premature’, but nevertheless considered it to be necessary ‘as 
a precautionary measure’.15 Thus, the last word on the matter might not yet have been 
spoken: once the Council directive which implements enhanced cooperation in the 
area of a financial transaction tax is adopted, the UK might well decide to bring 
another challenge if it believes that the directive impinges on its interests and 
especially on those of the City of London.      
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